We prove de Finetti style representation theorems covering the class of all probability functions satisfying spectrum exchangeability in polyadic inductive logic and give an application by characterizing those probability functions satisfying spectrum exchangeability which can be extended to a language with equality whilst still satisfying that property.
Introduction
Inductive logic can be seen as the product of trying to answer the following question purely by applying logical, or rational, principles or considerations: Given a sentence from a first order language what belief, i.e. subjective probability, should I assign to it in the absence of any further knowledge? More generally if I am required to assign probabilities to the sentences of this language and have no further information to guide me how should I then choose my probability function?
The best possible outcome here, which harkens back to Johnson [13] , and slightly later Carnap [1] [2] [3] [4] , would be to show that such an apparently arbitrary choice is in fact forced once I am required to observe certain principles which it would be deemed illogical or irrational in the circumstances (i.e. of having no further information) to flout. For example distinguishing between the probability I assigned to Pða 1 Þ and Pða 2 Þ when up to dummy subscripts these sentences are indistinguishable.
Whether or not this ideal is anything like attainable it is certainly the case that we can postulate putatively rational principles restricting the possible choices of probability function, w say, and investigating their consequences and relationships, much in the way we propose and investigate axioms in set theory.
Such a programme was initiated by Johnson et al. for purely unary languages and would, one assumes from the comments of Carnap [1, pp. 123-124] in 1950 and Kemeny [14] in 1954, have progressed to higher arity relations had not Goodman's GRUE paradox [9, 10] , struck what the majority of philosophers perceived as a death blow to the whole enterprise as a practical guide to our everyday belief formation. In consequence, with the notable exception of [17, 12] the step to polyadic inductive logic has only recently been seriously investigated, as in for example in [20, 21, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] 30] .
Apart from its intrinsic interest a major reason for reviving the Johnson-Carnap programme is that in the latter half of the intervening 50 year hiatus uncertain reasoning has become topic of considerable interest and importance in artificial intelligence. Whilst uncertain reasoning has always had a much wider scope than the Carnapian version of inductive logic this latter clearly now falls under its umbrella, in particular within what might be termed first order predicate probability logic. Naturally much of the current research in that topic within artificial intelligence is aimed, ultimately, at practical applications which, given the practical shortcomings exposed by the GRUE paradox, might suggest that within this sphere inductive logic was of no more than theoretical interest.
However the 'practical shortcomings' exposed by GRUE were concerned with human reasoning. In artificial intelligence much of the reasoning concerns agents where the situation is very different. Unlike human beings these agents start life in a form that can be truly close to 'zero knowledge' and if we have ideas and intuitions about what should be considered rational or logical ways to reason and act in this context then we would seem bound to consider them as criteria. From this viewpoint alone then reopening the mine of inductive logic would seem justified.
In this paper we shall continue the development cited above by proving some representation results for what we believe to be an important class of probability functions relevant to this programme.
In more detail, our framework will be the full polyadic generalization of that introduced in [25] : Let L be a first order language containing finitely many relation symbols P 1 ; P 2 ; . . . ; P q with arities r 1 ; r 2 ; . . . ; r q , respectively, countably many constants a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ; . . . (the implicit intention being that these exhaust the universe) and no function symbols nor equality. For later use let Lð¼Þ be L with equality added. The language L will be fixed throughout and it will be assumed to contain at least one non-unary relation. Let SL; QFSL, respectively, denote the sentences and quantifier free sentences of L.
Throughout we shall use b 1 ; b 2 ; . . . and b0 1 ; b0 2 ; . . . to denote distinct constants a i from L. A function w : SL ! ½0; 1 is a probability function on L if it satisfies that for all h; /; 9x wðxÞ 2 SL:
(P1) If ' h then wðhÞ ¼ 1.
(P2) If ' q ðh^/Þ then wðh _ /Þ ¼ wðhÞ þ wð/Þ. (P3) wð9x wðxÞÞ ¼ lim n!1 w W n i¼1 wða i Þ À Á :
By a theorem of Gaifman (see [7] ) any probability function defined on QFSL (i.e. satisfying (P1) and (P2) for h; / 2 QFSL) extends uniquely to a probability function on L. Hence we can limit our considerations to probability functions defined just on QFSL. By the disjunctive normal form theorem it then follows that w is determined simply by its values on the state descriptions, that is sentences of the form Hðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ where Hðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ ¼q s¼1î 1 ;i 2 ;...;ir s 2f1;...;mg
where AEP stands for P or q P, respectively. We use SDðm;bÞ to denote the set of such state descriptions on m, or just SDðmÞ whenb is implicit in the context. If there is any danger of confusion we write SD L ðmÞ; SD L ðm;bÞ to indicate the language involved.
An important property which will be frequently used is that for a probability function w, a state description Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ and n P m, we have wðHðb 1 ; . . . ; b m ÞÞ ¼ X W2SDðnÞ Wðb 1 ;...;bnÞHðb 1 ;...;bmÞ wðWðb 1 ; . . . ; b n ÞÞ: ð2Þ
As explained above the intention here is that w should correspond to a 'rational' assignment of probabilities on the sentences of L where 'rational' is to be captured by requiring w to satisfy certain principles which we judge are at least necessary for this rationality requirement. Of these the most basic is surely constant exchangeability, the requirement that since there is nothing in their properties to distinguish one constant from another w should be invariant under permutations of the constants. More precisely:
The constant exchangeability principle (Ex) If h 0 is the result of replacing a constant a i throughout the sentence h by a constant a j not already appearing in h then wðh 0 Þ ¼ wðhÞ.
Henceforth we shall assume, usually without further mention, that all the probability functions we consider satisfy Ex.
In the case that L is a purely unary language, that is all the relations in L are unary, de Finetti's Representation Theorem tells us exactly what the probability functions w on L look like. Since this result is relevant to what follows we shall spend a little time explaining it.
Suppose for the moment that the relation symbols P 1 ; P 2 ; . . . ; P q of L are all unary. In this case the state descriptions
where the a 1 ðxÞ; . . . ; a 2 q ðxÞ run through the atoms
where r j is the number of times j appears amongst the h 1 ; h 2 ; . . . ; h m . Then wp satisfies Ex and furthermore.
Theorem 1 (de Finetti's representation theorem [6] ). Let w be a probability function on the unary language L. Then w satisfies
Ex if and only if there is a measure l on D 2 q such that for any state description
where r j is the number of times j appears amongst the h 1 ; h 2 ; . . . ; h m .
We remark that if instead of Ex we take the stronger Atom Exchangeability, Ax, meaning that
r is a permutation of f1; 2; . . . ; 2 q g then the same representation result holds but with l required to be invariant under permutations of the coordinates. de Finetti's Theorem plays a central role in the study of conventional, unary, inductive logic, firstly because it gives us transparent access to examples of probability functions satisfying Ex and Ax and secondly, and most importantly, because it enables us to restyle problems from inductive logic in the elementary differential and integral calculus where we already have well developed intuitions and techniques.
The above results apply when the language is purely unary. What we want to do now is to revert back to a not purely unary language L and derive some de Finetti style representation theorems in that case. For Ex such a theorem has already been proved by Hoover, [12] (see also the earlier [17] ). What we shall do in this paper is prove such results (they split into two cases) for w satisfying spectrum exchangeability, Sx, the polyadic generalization of atom exchangeability. Spectrum exchangeability appears, see [20, 21, 25, 28] , to be a central concept in polyadic inductive logic so we would argue that a representation theorem of this form promises to be of some value in future. Indeed the methods and results of this paper have already found applications, see [19, 20, 22] , in the derivation of principles of language invariance and (polyadic) instantial relevance. This later topic has, since the initial development by Carnap, been central to inductive logic and is one where, in the unary case, de Finetti's theorem had previously proved a most effective tool, see [8, 29] .
We should remark at this point that in the unary context there has been a technically somewhat similar (and earlier) development to the one we give here for polyadic inductive logic, directed towards the study within probability theory of exchangeable partitions, see in particular Kingman [15, 16] and Zabell [31, Chapter 10] , and its application to inductive reasoning in the situation where the number of classes into which future observations may fall is not fixed in advance. Whilst that is essentially for unary properties and not relations we shall see an overlap in the penultimate section of this paper (Corollary 13 3 ) once we allow equality into our languages. It indeed seems possible that one could work back to some of the results in this paper from that point, though for the sake of selfcontainedness, accessibility and familiarity of context and ethos within logic our present approach seems to us justified.
The plan of this paper will be as follows. In the next section we shall explain the principle of spectrum exchangeability and describe a family of probability functions on L which satisfy this principle and, ultimately, will act like the wp in the version of de Finetti's theorem stated above, at least for the class of homogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx. The main theorem to this effect will then be proved. Following that we shall give a similar result for heterogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx. Together these will effectively encompass all probability functions satisfying Sx. Finally we give an application of the representation theorem to characterize when a probability function on L satisfying Sx can be extended to Lð¼Þ and continue to satisfy Sx.
Spectrum exchangeability
In order to explain spectrum exchangeability we need to introduce some notation. Given H 2 SDðm;bÞ, we define an equivalence $ H on f1; 2; . . . ; mg as follows:
i$ H j if whenever H 0 ðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ is obtained from Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ by replacing some of the occurrences of b i by b j and/or some of the occurrences b j by b i then H 0 ðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ is consistent with Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ. Putting it another way i$ H j if
is consistent with the axioms of equality (for the language Lð¼Þ), which we may also express as 'b i ; b j are indistinguishable with respect to Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ'.
Clearly $ H is an equivalence relation. In practice we shall sometimes also write b i $ H b j in place of i$ H j and treat $ H as the corresponding equivalence relation on f b 1 ; . . . ; b m g.
A spectrum on m of length s is a vectors ¼ hs 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s s i of natural numbers with s 1 P s 2 P Á Á Á P s s > 0 and
We use SpecðmÞ for the set of spectra on m and denote the length of a spectrums by jsj. For H a state description the spectrum of H, denoted SðHÞ, is defined to be the vector of sizes of the (non-empty) equivalence classes with respect to $ H , in nonincreasing order.
The spectrum exchangeability principle (Sx)
m Þ are state descriptions and SðHÞ ¼ SðUÞ then Sx is the direct generalization of atom exchangeability from unary to polyadic languages since to say that two state descriptionŝ m i¼1 a g i ðb i Þ;m i¼1 a h i ðb i Þ in a unary language with atoms a 1 ðxÞ; . . . ; a 2 q ðxÞ have the same spectrum is just to say that the multisets
are equal, which is equivalent to saying that there is a permutation r of f1; 2; . . . ; 2 q g such that
are the same up to a permutation of the constants b i . Ax then, together with the standing assumption of Ex, is equivalent to
In turn then Sx can be justified in a similar fashion to Ax. 4 In short that knowing nothing about the individual relations the only reason we might have for giving different probabilities to the state descriptions Hðb
is because they have different spectra. 5 However there is another reason for promoting, or at least being interested in, the principle Sx. One is that Sx has a number of desirable consequences for issues such as conformity, language invariance and instantial relevance, see [23] for a survey. In short Sx goes a very long way in clarifying the study of polyadic inductive logic, in a way that no other principle proposed in the half century or so since Carnap and Kemeny first pointed to the challenge of going beyond just unary predicates has come near to emulating. In subjects such as set theory axioms are commonly proposed because of their value in clarifying and bringing order to chaos and there seems to us no reason why such a criterion should not also apply here to the study and standing of spectrum exchangeability.
Given spectras on m andr on n let Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ be a state description with SðHÞ ¼s and define Nðs;rÞ to be the number of state descriptions Wðb 1 ; . . . ; b n Þ with spectrumr on n that extend H, in other words such that Wðb 1 ; . . . ; b n Þ Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ. It is shown in [18] , and in [24, 25] for binary L, that Nðs;rÞ is correctly defined in that it does not depend on which H with spectrums is chosen. Note that for w satisfying Sx and H 2 SDðmÞ with spectrums the Eq. (2) becomes wðHÞ ¼ X r2SpecðnÞ
Nðs;rÞwðrÞ ð3Þ
for all n P m, where wðrÞ stands for (any) wðWÞ with SðWÞ ¼r. Finally let1 t denote the spectrum with length t and every coordinate equal to 1.
The probability functions u p
In this section we will introduce some basic probability functions, u p , which will act like the wp in the version of the stated de Finetti theorem in the case of our main representation result. Let
and endow B with the standard weak product topology inherited from ½0; 1 1 , that is using as the open basis the sets of the form
We shall be thinking of p i as the probability of picking 'colour' i (from some urn). Amongst these colours 0 will stand for the colour 'black' and will have a special status as we shall shortly explain. By induction on m 2 N we shall now simultaneously define probabilities j p ðHðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ;cÞ 4 Johnson and Carnap were both apparently willing to accept a stronger principle, the so called Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, which with Ex implies Ax.
Direct generalizations of this stronger Principle to the present context of polyadic inductive logic appear problematic, see [18, 30] , though its extension to the unary context where the number of classes is not fixed beforehand (see [15, 16, 31, 5] for the wider framework of predictive lower previsions), or to polyadic languages with equality (see [23] ) yields characterizations analogous to those of Carnap's Continuum [2] . 5 The original justification for Sx was different from this but since it relied on considerations rather outside the remit of this paper we shall just refer the reader to [25] .
for all state descriptions Hðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ and sequences of colours c ¼ hc 1 ; c 2 ; . . . ; c m i 2 f0; 1; 2; . . . g m :
The idea behind the number j p ðHðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ;cÞ is that it is the probability of picking the colours c 1 ; c 2 ; . . . ; c m in that order and after each such choice c i of colour picking a state description H i ðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b i Þ extending the one we already have (i.e.
in such a way that after m choices we have picked colours c 1 ; c 2 ; . . . ; c m and have constructed H m ðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ ¼ Hðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ. However some rules will apply concerning the permitted choice of exten-
These rules will ensure that if j; k 6 i and c j ¼ c k -0 (i.e. they are the same non-black colour) then b j and b k will be indistinguishable with respect to
In the case that c i already appears amongst c 1 ;
with that colour are all indistinguishable from each other with respect to H iÀ1 ðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b iÀ1 Þ this will not cause any conflict.) So in this case there is only one choice of extension and the equivalence classes of $ H i are just those of $ H iÀ1 but with i joining the equivalence class containing those j < i for which c j ¼ c i . Note however that there may be other k < i in this same class but associated with different colours.
In the case when c i is 0 (i.e. colour black) or a new colour which has not already appeared
In this case all these possible choices of extension H i ðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b i Þ are given equal probability and i may or may not join an existing equivalence class of $ H iÀ1 . If it does not join an existing class but forms one of its own it may result in some of the equivalence classes of $ H iÀ1 splitting apart in $ H i . This can happen because classes in $ H iÀ1 may contain j; k with c j -c k and there is no requirement in the choice of H i ðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b i Þ that b i respects the current indistinguishability of such b j ; b k (unlike the case when they correspond to the same non-black colour). Notice then that if b i gets colour black, i.e. c i ¼ 0, then there will be no requirement for any other b j , of any colour, to remain for ever indistinguishable from b i . Indeed since we must have had p 0 > 0 to have ever chosen black in the first place in almost all future b iþ1 ; b iþ2 ; . . . black at least will have been chosen infinitely often and with probability 1 will distinguish b i from any other b j .
To give an example here for the language with a single binary relation R let 
Having spent some time giving a fairly full but informal description of this process and what it entails we now give a formal summary of the construction: For m ¼ 0 set j p ð>; ;Þ ¼ 1. Suppose that at stage m we have defined the probabilities If c mþ1 is the same as an earlier colour c j , with c j -0 extend Hðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ to the unique state description
On the other hand if c mþ1 is 0 or a colour different from all those previously chosen then randomly choose a state description H þ ðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m ; b mþ1 Þ extending Hðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ so that when i; j 6 q are such that c i ¼ c j -0 then b i $ H þ b j (where 'randomly' means that we take all possibilities with equal probability). 6 Clearly for this new pair H By a straightforward generalization of the result in [25] (where just two colours were considered) u p satisfies Sx (and hence also Ex).
It is easy to see that when l is a probability measure on B and we define
then w is a probability function on SL satisfying Sx.
Our aim is to show that the converse is true in the case that w is homogeneous, where w is homogeneous if for all k lim n!1 X H2SDðnÞ jSðHÞj¼k wðHða 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n ÞÞ ¼ 0:
We shall then go on to show a similar representation theorem in the case when w is t-heterogeneous, where w is t-heterogeneous if lim n!1 X H2SDðnÞ jSðHÞj¼t wðHða 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n ÞÞ ¼ 1:
In other words the probability that all the a i will fall in some t (non-empty) equivalence classes with respect to indistinguishability is 1. Note that for a t-heterogenous w, wðWÞ ¼ 0 whenever jSðWÞj > t.
Between them these two cases effectively cover all w satisfying Sx since by [25, Theorem 7] 7 every w satisfying Sx can be represented 8 in the form
where the g t P 0; P 1 t¼0 g t ¼ 1, the w ½t satisfy Sx, w ½0 is homogeneous and w ½t is t-heterogeneous for t > 0.
In the next section we will, after a series of lemmas, give a proof of this main theorem for homogeneous w satisfying Sx.
The representation theorem -homogenous case
We shall need some more notation:
For H 2 SDðmÞ let Rf ðHÞ stand for the set of partitions d ¼ fdð1Þ; . . . ; dðl d Þg that are refinements of $ H .
For d 2 Rf ðHÞ let ZðdÞ be the set of mappings q from f1; . . . ; l d g to f0; 1; 2; . . .g that satisfy if qðiÞ ¼ qðjÞ then i ¼ j or qðiÞ ¼ qðjÞ ¼ 0;
ð5Þ if qðiÞ ¼ 0 then jdðiÞj ¼ 1;
ð6Þ and let Z t ðdÞ be the set of injective mappings from f1; . . . ; l d g to f1; 2; . . . ; tg.
The following lemma follows directly from the definition of the u p . . . . ; b m Þ must be jSDðl d Þj À1 , which accounts for that factor in (7) and completes the proof. h
We now exhibit two, rather technical, expressions for Nð;;rÞ; Nðs;rÞ where ; is the empty spectrum:
Lemma 3. Let m < n and lets ¼ hs 1 ; . . . ; s s i be a spectrum on m andr ¼ hr 1 ; . . . ; r t i a spectrum on n. Let q i be the number entries inr equal to i. Assume that Hðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ 2 SDðmÞ has spectrums. Then
Nðs;rÞ This gives the result in the case that all the r j are different. Otherwise let q i be the number of r j equal to i. Then, as compared with the expression obtained above when all the r j were different we will now be counting eachr Q n i¼0 q i ! times. Hence this divisor in (9) . h We remark that if the p from Lemma 4 is such that p i ¼ 0 for i ¼ 0 and for i > t then ZðdÞ and Z G ðdÞ may be replaced by Z t ðdÞ and Z t G ðdÞ, respectively (where Z t G ðdÞ is the set of those q from Z t ðdÞ that satisfy (11) ).
Lemma 5. Continuing to use the notation of Lemma 3, for a fixed d,
where the O term does not depend onr. 
Let G be such that r j P n 1 2 for 1 6 i 6 G and p j < n 1 2 for j > G: 
We have
By Lemma 4 this changes by at most l d n À 1 2 when Z t G ðdÞ is replaced by Z t ðdÞ so the lemma follows from (12) 
This identity will be key in our proof of the main theorem in the case of homogeneous w. In short we shall arrange that as n tends to infinity the summation becomes an integral, the fraction Nðs;rÞNð;;rÞ À1 becomes u hð pÞ ðHÞ and the l n become a limit measurel. As a result we will obtain the following theorem from which our main Representation Theorem for homogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx is a straightforward corollary. Proof. H is compact so the l n have a convergent subsequence -letl be such a limit. As indicated above, the proof is via taking the limit as n tends to infinity in (14) 
wðWÞ: ð16Þ
To conclude the proof we need the following lemma: Before proving the lemma we note how the theorem follows: Allowing n to tend to infinity, by virtue of the compactness of H and the above lemma the first summand in (16) First we shall show the following claim:
By Lemma 2 we have
Since
Hence noting that the number of d over which the sum in (18) is taken is finite (less than m m ), applying Lemma 4 we obtain
Analyzing (19) in more detail, we note that each q splits into q 1 and q 2 according to the image being greater than 0 and less or equal to G, or not. Taking this into account we can write (19) as
where Imðq 1 Þ # f1; 2; . . . ; Gg; Imðq 2 Þ # f0; G þ 1; . . .g: 
where T 1 ðD; GÞ is the set of injective mappings from D to f1; 2; . . . ; Gg, and for F # f1; . . . ; l d g Q ðFÞ ¼ X
where T 2 ðF; GÞ is the set of mappings q 2 from F to f0; G þ 1; G þ 2; . . .g such that if q 2 ðiÞ ¼ q 2 ðjÞ then i ¼ j or q 2 ðiÞ ¼ q 2 ðjÞ ¼ 0 :
where the summation on the right hand side is over those hi 1 ; . . . ; i jFj i 2 f0; G þ 1; . . . g jFj for which some entry other than 0 is repeated. Furthermore
and we have
Consequently,
Moreover, for a fixed D 
which is the same as (18) only with p replaced by I G ð pÞ i.e. the same as u I G ð pÞ ðHÞ. This proves the claim. Let C > 0 be such that ju p ðHÞ À u I G ð pÞ ðHÞj 6 CG À1 :
To prove the lemma, first note that for each G 2 N; f (as defined in the statement of the lemma) restricted to the set H G ¼ f y 2 H j y i ¼ 0 for all i > Gg is a polynomial when viewed as a mapping from this set (with the usual metric inherited from R G ) to R. Let g G be the corresponding constant satisfying jf ð y 1 Þ À f ð y 2 Þj 6 g G k y 1 À y 2 k 6 g G G max jy 1 i À y 2 i j j i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; G È É :
Note that for y ¼ hy 1 ; y 2 ; . . .i 2 H we have I G ðhð yÞÞ ¼ hðhy 1 ; . . . ; y G ; 0; . . .iÞ.
Let z 2 H and > 0. Let G be such that G À1 < =ð3CÞ and let U be the neighbourhood of z in H consisting of those 
Conversely any such probability function w on SL defined in this way satisfies Sx.
Proof. Let l ¼lh À1 in Theorem 6. h
Although the above representation theorem is stated for homogenous probability functions, other probability functions that are mixtures of homogenous and t-heterogenous ones can also have such a representation. In fact -as shown in [20] and discussed in the last section of this paper -probability functions on non purely unary languages which can be represented in this way are exactly those that belong to a language invariant family 9 of probability functions satisfying Sx, and in each such case the representing measure uniquely characterizes the language invariant family. This makes representations via the u p rather desirable and special. On the other hand it also follows from results in [20] that no t-heterogenous probability function has such a representation.
In the next section we shall however show how the functions u p and our proof need to be modified in order to obtain a corresponding representation theorem for t-heterogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx. In fact such a theorem had already been proved in [28] (via a generalization to the polyadic case of an alternative representation theorem (for binary L) in [25] ) but being so close it seems opportune to derive it again directly here.
The representation theorem -heterogenous case
In this section we shall assume that w is a t-heterogeneous probability function satisfying Sx. Define H t to be the space H t ¼ỹ ¼ hy 1 ; . . . ; y t i j y 1 P . . . P y t P 0; X t i¼1 y i ¼ 1
( )
with the usual topology inherited from R t . Note that H t is compact. Let B t be the subspace of H t containing thoseỹ with y t > 0.
First we define probability functions vp forp 2 H t in a similar fashion to the way we defined earlier defined the u p . The definition is simpler in that there is no p 0 and thep are now vectors of length t rather than infinite sequences. However, there is the added complication of not choosing the allowed extensions H þ with equal probability but choosing them so that when continuing the process, the spectra of state descriptions that are being chosen forp 2 B t must eventually have length t. 
vpðHÞdlðpÞ:
Conversely any such probability function w on SL defined in this way satisfies Sx and is t-heterogenous.
Adding equality
In this section we give an application of the Representation Theorem 6 to characterize exactly which probability functions w in L (L now possibly purely unary) can be extended to a probability function w eq on Lð¼Þ also satisfying Sx, where probability functions on Lð¼Þ are defined as before but with the axioms of equality assumed in the definition of ' as usual. We adopt the convention that a probability function on a language with equality will be denoted by a letter with subscript eq. Consistent sentences of the form Dðb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m Þ, where as usual the b i are some distinct constants from L and
are called equality tables onb and the set of such sentences (29) is denoted ETðm;bÞ, or just ETðmÞ whenb is clear from the context. Any D 2 ETðmÞ defines an equivalence $ D on f1; 2; . . . ; mg,
As expected let SðDÞ be the spectrum of this equivalence relation, that is the vector of sizes of the non-empty equivalence classes with respect to $ D in non-increasing order.
A probability function w eq on Lð¼Þ is determined by its values on sentences of the form Before proving the main theorem of this section the following lemma will be needed, and is of some interest in its own right.
Lemma 11. Let w 1 eq satisfy Sx on a language L 1 ð¼Þ and let L 2 be a language extending L 1 (with just finitely many relations etc. as usual). Then w 1 eq has a unique extension w 2 eq to L 2 ð¼Þ satisfying Sx.
Proof. First note that if w 2 eq is to be such an extension then it would have to satisfy that if D 2 ETðmÞ and H; U 2 SD L 2 ðmÞ are such that D^H; D^U are consistent, then w 2 eq ðD^HÞ ¼ w 2 eq ðD^UÞ. Hence it is forced that w 2 eq ðD^HÞ ¼ w 2 eq ðDÞ jSD L 2 ðjSðDÞjÞj ¼ w 1 eq ðDÞ jSD L 2 ðjSðDÞjÞj ð30Þ since jSD L 2 ðjSðDÞjÞj is the number of state descriptions U 2 SD L 2 ðmÞ such that D^U is consistent. It only remains then to show that w 2 eq defined in this way is (more precisely extends to) a probability function since Sx then follows from (30) (due to the fact that w 2 eq ðD^HÞ only depends on SðDÞ), and w 2 eq extends w 1 eq . To show that w 2 eq is indeed a probability function it is enough to show that for H 2 SD L 2 ðmÞ; D 2 ETðmÞ and D^H consistent w 2 eq ðD^HÞ ¼
But from (30), w 2 eq ðD^HÞ ¼
and the first fraction in the summation (32) is w 2 eq ðD þ^Hþ Þ for any H þ such that D þ^Hþ is consistent. The second fraction equals the number of extensions H þ of H such that D þ^Hþ is consistent so (32) equates to the right hand side of (31), as required. h Lemma 11 shows that once we have one probability function w eq satisfying Sx on a language Lð¼Þ (indeed = could be the only relation symbol in Lð¼Þ) then we can extend (and if necessary subsequently marginalize) w eq to a w L eq on any language L (subject to the usual limitations, with or without equality) and retain Sx. Furthermore the probability functions w L eq formed in this way can be seen to form a language invariant family satisfying Sx, even when this notion is extended to allow equality in the language.
With this lemma and observations to hand we are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 12. Let w be a probability function on L that satisfies Sx. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) w has an extension w eq on Lð¼Þ satisfying Sx.
(2) w has a representation in the form wðHÞ ¼ Z B u p ðHÞ dlð pÞ: ð33Þ
(3) w is a member of a language invariant family of probability functions w L satisfying Sx. 10 Furthermore, when the language L is not purely unary and (1) holds then the extension w eq and the language invariant family in (3) are unique. 11
Proof. That (2) and (3) are equivalent is proved in [20] . From Lemma 11 and the above discussion we know that (1) implies (3) . So it is enough to show that (2) implies (1). 10 It can be easily seen from the theorem and the above discussion that w being a member of a language invariant family satisfying Sx, where we also allow equality in the language, is another equivalent condition. 11 It need not be unique when L is purely unary, see [20] .
The proof of Proposition 14 provides a good example of one of the values of representation theorems such as those presented here. Namely they may allow us to reduce the problem of showing that all probability functions in some class satisfy a property to the problem of showing that special, and easily comprehended, representatives from that class satisfy the property. In the case in question showing that the required inequality holds for the u p eq . (In fact this same proposition can also be proved for any w (without equality) satisfying the representation given in (33), again by considering just the case for the u p . Details may be found in [22] .)
Conclusions
We have proved two de Finetti style representation theorems which, together with the general version of [25, Theorem 7] , see [18] , cover all probability functions (on a not purely unary language) satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability. The value of such a result is that it enables us to tap into the very special forms of the u p and vp and the well developed theory of the integral and differential calculus in order prove further results about such probability functions. In particular in this paper we have exploited the representation to characterize when a probability function on L satisfying Sx can be extended to one on Lð¼Þ also satisfying Sx.
In [19, 20] the method was also used to characterize the property of language invariance in the presence of Sx and in [22] it again found (apparently) essential use in deriving a particular (polyadic) Principle of Instantial Relevance. It is to be hoped that further uses may emerge in future, in particular in relation to a wider range of relevance principles in polyadic inductive logic.
